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Abstract. Our aim is to formulate continuous-variable quantum secret sharing as
a continuous-variable ramp quantum secret sharing protocol, provide a certification
procedure for it and explain the criteria for the certification. Here we introduce a
technique for certifying continuous-variable ramp quantum secret-sharing schemes
in the framework of quantum interactive-proof systems. We devise pseudocodes
in order to represent the sequence of steps taken to solve the certification problem.
Furthermore, we derive the expression for quantum mutual information between
the quantum secret extracted by any multi-player structure and the share held by
the referee corresponding to the Tyc-Rowe-Sanders continuous-variable quantum
secret-sharing scheme. We solve by converting the Tyc-Rowe-Sanders position
representation for the state into a Wigner function from which the covariance
matrix can be found, then insert the covariance matrix into the standard formula
for continuous-variable quantum mutual information to obtain quantum mutual
information in terms of squeezing. Our quantum mutual information result
quantifies the leakage of the ramp quantum secret-sharing schemes.
1. Introduction
Secret sharing (SS) is an information theoretically secure cryptographic protocol
that is applicable to online auctions, electronic voting, shared electronic banking
and cooperative activation in the classical domain [1], and distributed quantum
computing in the quantum regime [2]. Ramp classical [3, 4] and quantum [5, 6] secret-
sharing (SS) schemes were proposed to reduce the communication complexity by the
sacrifice of security conditions. Continuous-variable quantum secret sharing (CV
QSS) [7, 8, 9] has been formulated in the framework of discrete-variable quantum
SS schemes [10], which does not accommodate the quantum-information leakage
inherent in continuous representations of quantum information. Our aim is to
formulate CV QSS as a continuous-variable (CV) ramp quantum secret sharing
(RQSS) protocol and introduce a technique to certify the protocol.
In order to reach our aims, we introduce four advances in our work. We develop
the quantum mutual-information approach to the continuous-variable regime for
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evaluating the security of CV QSS schemes. We derive quantum mutual information
between referee and any multi-player structure corresponding to the Tyc-Rowe-
Sanders (TRS03) CV QSS scheme [7]. Furthermore, we introduce a certification
technique for CV QSS in the framework of quantum-interactive proofs [11, 12, 13] and
demonstrating the necessity of it being a RQSS scheme. Also we give an upper bound
for the failure probability in terms of the number of experimental runs from which
the referee knows how many rounds are required to have sufficient information.
We focus on the “quantum-quantum” (QQ) SS schemes [10] (in which the secret
is a quantum state and communication occurs over quantum channels) because
the “classical quantum” (CQ) SS schemes (which is for sharing a classical message
over quantum channels) [14, 15], can be simulated by QKD and classical secret
sharing [16]. The QQ case was extended to CV regime by Tyc and Sanders [8] and has
been realized experimentally for three players, any two of whom are authorized to
extract the secret state [9, 17]. Importantly, TRS03 later showed that the continuous-
variable quantum state sharing could be extended to a (k, n) threshold scheme (a
class of QSS schemes in which the authorized structure consists of all groups of k or
more players while there are n players in total [10]), without a corresponding scale
up in quantum resources.
Whereas conditional entropy is employed for evaluating the security of CC
schemes, quantum mutual information is needed for the quantum case [18].
Quantum mutual information has been used as a means to evaluate the secrecy
condition of Cleve-Gottesman-Lo QSS in the (2, 3) case [18]. TRS03 characterized
the quality of secret extraction for their scheme by calculating the fidelity in terms of
squeezing parameter between the original and the extracted secret for an arbitrary
coherent state as the secret. However, fidelity is not a distance measure [19].
Hence, we develop the alternative and more meaningful quantum mutual-
information approach for evaluating the CV QSS security. Restricting to Gaussian
states and operations allows all the calculation to be performed within the convenient
framework of the semidirect product
HW(n)o Sp (2n,R) , (1)
which is the continuous-variable Clifford group, with Sp (2n,R) the symplectic
group and HW(2n,R) the Heisenberg-Weyl group for n modes [20]. This
representation makes calculations tractable but ignores potentially powerful non-
Gaussian operations [21].
Our paper is organized as follows. In §2, we briefly review the theoretical
background on continuous-variable quantum information with Gaussian states and
Gaussian operations, mutual information and discrete-variable ramp quantum SS
protocols. We detail our approach in §3. The mathematical results are presented in
§4. We conclude with a discussion of our results in §5.
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2. Background
This section provides the required context to tackle the problem which is solved in
this paper. We begin the section by theoretical background on continuous-variable
quantum information with Gaussian states and Gaussian operations. Then we
discuss quantum mutual information, which is a necessary tool for defining and
evaluating quantum SS schemes. Finally, we discuss basic results of RQSS schemes.
2.1. Continuous-variable quantum information with Gaussian states and Gaussian
operations
In this subsection, we begin by introducing Gaussian states [22] and some of their
important properties. Then we explain the Gaussian preserving maps, which
preserve the Gaussian property of quantum states. Finally, we discuss continuous-
variable quantum secret sharing based on TRS03 CV QSS scheme.
2.1.1. Gaussian states A continuous-variable quantum state is an continuously
parameterized element of Hilbert space described by observables with continuous
eigenspectra. Typically, a continuous-variable quantum state is described by n
bosonic modes, associated with a tensor-product Hilbert space
H ⊗n =
k=n⊗
k=1
Hk ∼ L2 (Rn) , (2)
i.e., square integrable complex-valued functions over RN and a vector of quadrature
operators
xˆ := (qˆ1, pˆ1, ..., qˆn, pˆn)> (3)
for > denoting transpose. The vector xˆ satisfies the commutation relation
[
xˆi, xˆj
]
= Ωij, Ω =
n⊕
k=1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
, (4)
known as the symplectic form.
An arbitrary continuous-variable quantum state is characterized by a density
operator
ρ ∈ S(H ), (5)
where S(H ) is the set of positive semidefinite trace-class operators. These positive
trace-class operators can be represented by the Wigner function [23]
W (x) =
1
(2pi)2n
∫
R2n
d2nξ exp
(
−ix>ξ
)
χ (ξ) (6)
for
χ(ξ) := tr
[
ρDˆ(ξ)
]
, (7)
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being the the Wigner characteristic function and
Dˆ (ξ) := exp
(
ix>ξ
)
, ξ ∈ R2n (8)
being the Weyl operator. Wigner functions are particularly useful for calculating
expectation values of symmetrically ordered functions qˆ and pˆ denoted by S
(
qˆb pˆd
)
,
with S denoting symmetric ordering, and with expectation value
tr
[
ρS
(
qˆb pˆd
)]
=
∫
dqdp W (x) qb pd. (9)
Thus far, we have the Wigner representation for any state; now we restrict to
Gaussian states.
A Gaussian state is defined to be a state whose Wigner representation is
Gaussian. A Gaussian state can be completely characterized by its first moment
x¯ = tr
(
xˆρ
)
and covariance matrix V . The covariance matrix entries are
Vij :=
1
2
tr
[{∆xˆi,∆xˆj}] , ∆xˆi := xˆi − tr (xˆiρ) , i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, (10)
with {, } the anticommutator.
The symplectic manipulation of a Gaussian state’s covariance matrix can be used
to express its fundamental properties. By definition, a 2n× 2n real-valued matrix S
is called symplectic if it preserves the symplectic form of Eq. (3); i.e.,
SΩS> = Ω. (11)
According to the Williamson theorem [24], each covariance matrix V has a
corresponding symplectic transformation S satisfying
V = S
[
n⊕
k=1
νkIk
]
S>, (12)
with symplectic spectrum defined by the vector
ν := (ν1, . . . , νn) (13)
unique to each V and satisfying
n
∏
k=1
ν2k = detV . (14)
As an example, a two-mode Gaussian state has covariance matrix
V =
(
A C
C B
)
; A = A>,B = B>,C ∈ R2×2. (15)
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The symplectic spectrum is [25]
ν± =
√
∆±√∆2 − 4 detV
2
, (16)
where
∆ := detA+ detB + 2 detC. (17)
As Gaussian states are easy to describe mathematically, a large class of
transformations acting on such states are easy to characterize as well. In the next
section, we discuss this class of transformations called Gaussian preserving maps.
2.1.2. Gaussian-preserving maps Gaussian (linear) unitary Bogoliubov transforma-
tions are interactions that preserve the Gaussian character of a quantum state. In
terms of the quadrature operators, a Gaussian map is described by the affine map
(S,d) : Sxˆ+ d, d ∈ R2n, (18)
where S (10) is the matrix representation of the symplectic group. The most general
form of a Gaussian map in terms of its action on the statistical moments x¯ and V is
x¯ 7→ Sx¯+ d, V 7→ SV S>. (19)
A special class of Gaussian maps are linear canonical point transformations, for
which the positions and momenta transform separately and do not mix [26].
For single-mode squeezing we have the infinite-dimensional unitary representa-
tion [27]
S1 = e
1
2(ζ
? aˆ2−ζ aˆ†2), (20)
and for two-mode squeezing we have the infinite-dimensional unitary representation
S2 = e
1
2(ζ
? aˆ1 aˆ2−ζ aˆ†1 aˆ†2), (21)
where
aˆk =
qˆk + ipˆk√
2
, aˆ†k =
qˆk − ipˆk√
2
, ζ = seiθ, s ∈ R+. (22)
A two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state is mathematically represented as [27]
|ζ〉TMSV := S2 (ζ) |0〉 , ζ ∈ C. (23)
In the next section, we explain TRS03 continuous-variable quantum SS scheme in
which the Gaussian maps are used for encoding and decoding.
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2.1.3. Continuous-variable quantum secret sharing In this subsection, we explain the
TRS03 CV QSS scheme. In a (k, 2k− 1)-threshold scheme, the dealer possesses a pure
secret state |ψ〉 ∈H and encodes the quantum secret into an entangled state of 2k− 1
modes of the electromagnetic field by combining it with 2k− 2 ancillary states. The
dealer then distributes them among the n players, each of whom receive one share,
and at least k players must combine their shares in an active interferometer to extract
the secret state.
LetH (2k−1) be the tensor product of 2k− 1 copies ofH (1) and each player owns
one of these copies. Let us defineF2k−1 as the real linear space of coordinate functions
for R2k−1. Then a system of Euclidean coordinates
x = (x1, x2, . . . , x2k−1)
> ∈ R2k−1, (24)
is equivalent to choosing an orthonormal basis of coordinate functions
f := ( f1, f2, . . . , f2k−1)
> ∈ F2k−1 (25)
such that
fi : R2k−1 → R : (x) = xi (26)
with xi the ith coordinate of x (24), and fi · f j = δij.
Initially, the dealer starts with an unentangled tensor product
|Ψ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |φa〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φa〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
⊗ |φ1/a〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φ1/a〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, (27)
where |ψ〉 is the secret state and
φa (x) = 〈x|φa〉 =
(
pia2
)−1/4
e−x
2/2a2 . (28)
Let us write this state as
|Ψ〉 =
∫
dnxΨ(x) |x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉
=
∫
dnx Ψ (x) | f1(x)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ | fn(x)〉 , (29)
where
|Ψ〉 = ψ (x1)
k
∏
i=2
φa (xi)
n
∏
i=k+1
φ1/a (xi) . (30)
The dealer then performs the encoding using a linear canonical point
transformation
f j 7→ gi =∑
j
gij f j. (31)
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The corresponding unitary transformation then maps the state |Ψ〉 to
|det g|1/2
∫
d2k−1xΨ (x) |g1(x)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |g2k−1(x)〉 . (32)
The dealer, however, has to choose {gi} such that any k players are able to disentangle
the secret state but that fewer is unable to do so. For this purpose, in the case of
sufficiently large a, only the orthogonal projection ιi of each vector gi into the space
spanned by the vectors { f1, . . . , f2k−1} is important. The vectors {gi} then must be
chosen such that any k vectors from the set { f1, ι1, . . . , ι2k−1} are linearly independent.
This linear independence condition guarantees that any k players are able to extract
the secret.
For convenience, let us express F2k−1 ∈ R2k−1 as a direct sum of three mutually
orthogonal subspaces
F2k−1 = X⊕Y⊕Z, (33)
where X is the one-dimensional space spanned by f1 and Y and Z are k − 1-
dimensional spaces spanned by { f2, . . . , fk} and { fk+1, . . . , f2k−1}, respectively. Now
let us relabel {xi} coordinates as (x, yi, zi) coordinates with
x =x1, yi = xi+1, zi = xk+i, i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}. (34)
The wavefunction Ψ is then
Ψ (x) = ψ (x)
k−1
∏
i=1
φa (yi) φ1/a(zi). (35)
Without loss of generality, the first k players collaborate to retrieve the quantum
secret. The players then make the linear coordinate transformation
gi 7→ ξi =∑
j
ξij f j (36)
assuming ξi = gi for all i > k.
For convenience, let us define a decomposition for every vector ξi as a sum of
three mutually orthogonal vectors, each of which belongs to subspaces X, Y and Z
ξi = αi + βi + γi. (37)
Equivalently, we can write
ξi (x) = αix +∑
j
βijyj +∑
j
γijzj. (38)
In the case that the vectors gi are chosen in such a way that any k vectors from the set
{ f1, ι1, . . . , ι2k−1} are linearly independent, the players can design the transformation
gi 7→ ξi such that
α1 =1, β1 = 0,
αi+1 =αk+i, βi+1 = βk+i, (39)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}. Then transformation (39) extracts the secret for sufficiently
large values of parameter a.
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2.2. Mutual information
Here we review the key notions of mutual information, which is the method for
quantifying information security and defining quantum secret sharing. We begin
by presenting salient facts about Shannon and von Neumann entropy followed by
requisite knowledge concerning classical and quantum mutual information. Finally,
in this subsection, we discuss the security for discrete quantum secret sharing as our
aim is to analyze security for continuous-variable quantum secret sharing.
2.2.1. Shannon and von Neumann entropy Here we review Shannon and von Neu-
mann entropy as these notions of entropy underpin the formulation of classical and
quantum mutual information. This subsubsection also helps to elucidate the compact
notation we use throughout this paper.
Shannon entropy. Let Z be a statistical ensemble defined by a classical random
variable z and its associated probability distribution {pj} = {p1, . . . , pn}, which can
be expressed as a probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pn)>. The logarithm of this vector
(always using base 2 here) is
logp := (logpj). (40)
Using the Hadamard (elementwise) product a ◦ b := (aibi) [28] for vectors and the
sum of such elements a b := ∑i aibi, the Shannon entropy is
HSh(p) = −p logp = −p · log p. (41)
Thus, HSh yields the number of bits per letter needed to completely specify Z in the
asymptotic limit of infinitely long strings [29]. Shannon entropy is thus a measure
for the uncertainty of z or it indicates how much information each letter in the string
that uses the alphabet Z carries.
Von Neumann entropy In the same vein, the information content of a quantum
state ρ (5) can be quantified by determining how many qubits are needed to represent
state ρ in the asymptotic limit of an infinite ensemble of physical systems. This
quantum-information content, known as the von Neumann entropy [30], amounts
to computing a classical Shannon entropy (41)
HvN(ρ) = − tr (ρ log2 ρ) = HSh (specρ) , (42)
for specρ a vector comprising eigenvalues of the state ρ.
Continuous-variable quantum entropy. For continuous-variable Gaussian states, we
define the vectors
ν± := ν ± 1
2
(43)
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with ν the symplectic spectrum (13) and 1 the vector with all entries being unity.
Thus, the von Neumann entropy is [31]
HvN(ρ) = ν+  logν+ + ν−  logν−. (44)
These entropy expressions are used in the formulæ for mutual information.
Convenient notation for states in entropy formulæ A convenient notation for entropy,
which is independent of being classical or quantum, uses a label for the classical or
quantum state. Rather than specify the state as p classically or ρ quantumly, we label
the state by a capital letter such as A and B, with these labels commensurate with the
usual Alice-and-Bob nomenclature in cryptology [32].
Conditional entropy. Labelling the joint state held by A and B as AB, the conditional
entropy is abstractly expressed as
H (A|B) := H (AB)− H (B) (45)
for any valid formula for entropy, whether classical (41) or quantum (42).
Classical conditional entropy. The classical conditional entropy [33] is obtained from
Eq. (45) by replacing
H(A) 7→ HSh (pA) (46)
for pA the distribution held by A. Similarly, we replace
H(B) 7→ HSh (pB) (47)
and
H(AB) 7→ HSh (pAB) . (48)
H (A|B) quantifies the correlation between A and B as the reduction of the number
of bits per letter needed to specify A given B is known.
Quantum conditional entropy. The quantum conditional entropy [19] is obtained from
Eq. (45) by replacing
H(A) 7→ HvN (ρA) (49)
for ρA the quantum state held by A. Similarly, we replace
H(B) 7→ HvN (ρB) (50)
and
H(AB) 7→ HvN (ρAB) . (51)
Although classical conditional entropy is always positive, for evaluatingquantum
conditional entropy can be negative [34].
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2.2.2. Classical and quantum mutual information We explain classical mutual
information [33] and quantum mutual information [19], first as an abstract concept
regardless of whether classical or quantum information is chosen. Then we explain
each of classical and quantum mutual information. Quantum mutual information is
vital for evaluating security for secret sharing.
Mutual information. Labelling the joint state held by A and B as AB, mutual
information is abstractly expressed as
I (A; B) := H (A) + H (B)− H (AB) (52)
for any valid formula for entropy, whether classical (41) or quantum (42). Classical
mutual information [19] is obtained from Eq. (52) by replacing
H(X) 7→ HSh (pX) (53)
with X ∈ {A, B} for pX and
H(AB) 7→ HSh (pAB) (54)
as discussed in ¶2.2.1. Classical mutual information quantifies the correlation
between two statistical ensembles A and B as the reduction of the number of bits
per letter needed to specify one of the variables given the other variable is known.
Quantum mutual information. The quantum mutual information [19] is obtained
from Eq. (52) by replacing
H(A) 7→ HvN (ρA) (55)
for ρA the quantum state held by A. Similarly, we replace
H(B) 7→ HvN (ρB) (56)
and
H(AB) 7→ HvN (ρAB) . (57)
Quantum mutual information is always positive and quantifies the total correlations
contained in the bipartite state ρAB. Quantum mutual information is employed to
define and evaluate the security of quantum secret-sharing schemes (QSS).
Relation between conditional entropy and mutual information. The relation between
conditional entropy and mutual information is
I (A; B) = H (A)− H (A|B) = H (B)− H (B|A) (58)
for any valid formula for entropy, whether classical (41) or quantum (42). The relation
between classical mutual information and classical conditional entropy is obtained
from Eq. (58) by replacing
H(X) 7→ HSh (pX) (59)
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with X ∈ {A, B} and
H(X|Y) 7→ HSh (pXY)− HSh (pY) (60)
with (X, Y) ∈ {(A, B) , (B, A)} as discussed in ¶2.2.1.
The relation between quantum mutual information and quantum conditional
entropy is obtained from Eq. (58) by replacing
H(X) 7→ HvN (ρX) (61)
with X ∈ {A, B} and
H(X|Y) 7→ HvN (ρXY)− HvN (ρY) (62)
with (X, Y) ∈ {(A, B) , (B, A)} as discussed in ¶2.2.1.
2.2.3. Classical and quantum secret sharing In this subsubsection, we explain classical
and quantum secret-sharing protocols. We begin by establishing the agents of the
protocol namely dealer and players and the structures corresponding to the set
of players. Afterwards, we explain classical secret-sharing schemes along with
classical secrecy and recoverability conditions corresponding to them. Then we
define quantum secret sharing and provide the secrecy and recoverability conditions
corresponding to them based on quantum mutual information.
Dealer and players. We establish the agents of the protocol and the structures
corresponding to sets of players, who are one kind of agent. Specifically, secret
sharing comprises n + 1 agents, namely one dealer D and n players labelled
P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}. (63)
The power set of players is 2P , which is the set of all subsets of the set of players (63).
The role of the dealer is to encode the secret message S ∈ {0, 1}∗ (classically) or
ρs ∈ S (H ) (5) quantumly, into n shares and distributes them among players in such
a way that specific elements of 2P form the authorized structure A to retrieve the
secret message whereas other elements are denied any information about the secret
whatsoever. The set of elements that are denied any information is known as the
forbidden structure F .
Access structure. Let
F , A ⊆ 2P , F ,A 6= ∅, (64)
where F is monotonically decreasing and A is monotonically increasing, and
F ∩A = ∅. (65)
Then the set
Γ = {F ,A} (66)
is the access structure on P . Quantumly, the no-cloning theorem implies that the
existence of two disjoint authorized group is forbidden [35].
Continuous-variable ramp quantum secret sharing with Gaussian states and operations 12
Secret-sharing protocol. Let H be a Hilbert space and let S(H ) be all density
operators on a Hilbert space H . In a quantum secret-sharing scheme, the dealer’s
task is to encrypt a quantum secret ρs ∈ S (H ) into a composite system of Hilbert
spaces
H1,H2, . . . ,Hn, (67)
each of which is called a share labelled by S1, S2, . . . , Sn. Let
N := {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} (68)
be the entire set of shares and
HN :=
⊗
Si∈N
HSi (69)
be the corresponding Hilbert space. The dealer then distributes the shares among
players (63). For a subset A ⊆ N of shares
HA :=
⊗
Si∈A
HSi , (70)
the QSS encoding is
WN : S(H )→ S(HN), (71)
which is a completely positive and trace preserving map [5].
The composition map of the encoder WN for a subset X ⊆ N, and the partial
trace of the complement N \ X is
WX := trN\X WN. (72)
A QSS scheme is then defined by the quantum operation WN (71) that is reversible
with respect to S(H ). The set N is divided into two mutually disjoint structures A
and F [5].
(i) A set X ⊆ N is authorized if WX is reversible with respect to S(H ).
(ii) A set X ⊆ N is forbidden if WX is vanishing with respect to S(H ).
The arguments so far are valid in the classical cases, which is verified by replacing
the corresponding notions with the classical ones [5].
Classical secrecy and recoverability conditions. Classical secrecy is expressed in terms
of conditional entropy but equivalently can be expressed in terms of mutual
information. Strictly speaking, conditional entropy is between shares. However, for
simplicity, in the literature there is a tendency to refer to conditional entropy between
players. Π is a perfect SS scheme on Γ if
• ∀B ∈ A H (S|B) = 0
• ∀B /∈ AH (S|B) = H (S).
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Quantum secrecy and recoverabiliy conditions. Here we discuss quantum secrecy
conditions in terms of quantum mutual information. Strictly speaking, quantum
mutual information is between shares. However, for simplicity, in the literature
there is a tendency to refer to quantum mutual information between players. We
can imagine that the system ρs is part of a larger system and that this compound
system is initially in a pure state |ψRS〉. Therefore,
ρs = trR
(
|ψRS〉 〈ψRS|
)
. (73)
In a QSS, if a subset X ∈ 2P satisfies
I (R; X) = 0 (secrecy condition), (74)
then ρX does not contain any information about ρs [18]. On the other hand, if a subset
X satisfies
I (R; X) = I (R; S) (recoverability condition), (75)
then X contains full information about ρs [18].
Access structure. Specific subsets of players form the authorized structure
A :=
{
Y ∈ 2P ; I(R; S) = I(R; X)
}
(76)
to retrieve the message whereas the other subsets, i.e., the forbidden structure
F :=
{
X ∈ 2P ; I(R; X) = 0
}
, (77)
are denied any information about the secret whatsoever. We define the QSS access
structure as
Γ := {A,F} . (78)
Threshold secret sharing. ((k, n)) threshold QSS schemes are a class of QSS schemes in
which the authorized structure comprises all groups of k or more players while there
are n players in total (the use of double parentheses distinguishes it from a classical
scheme). ((k, n)) quantum threshold schemes exists provided no-cloning theorem is
satisfied [35]. Any quantum secret sharing scheme can be reduced to ((k, 2k − 1))
threshold schemes [35]. In QSS schemes, the size of shares allocated to each player
must be at least as large as the size of the secret [35, 5].
2.3. Ramp quantum secret-sharing scheme
As an extension of (k, n)–threshold SS schemes discussed in ¶2.2.3, ramp secret-
sharing (RSS) schemes were proposed by Blakley-Meadows [3] and Yamamoto [4]. In
RSS schemes, the dimension of each share is reduced compared to that of the original
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system by sacrifice security for admitting the intermediate property for some sets of
shares, which are denoted as intermediate sets.
In a (k, L, n) threshold RSS scheme, any k or more players are able to fully
reconstruct the secret s, whereas any k − L or less players are denied to obtain any
information of it. Furthermore, from arbitrary k − j shares for j ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1},
some information of the secret leak out with the size of jL in s.
A QSS scheme WN is called perfect if any set X ⊆ N is either authorized or
forbidden. Otherwise, WN is a RQSS scheme. The access structure of a RQSS scheme
is the list of the forbidden, intermediate, and authorized sets. A set X ⊆ N is
called intermediate if WX is neither vanishing nor reversible with respect toD(H ) [5].
Formally, the access structure of the set N is defined by a map
f : 2P → {0, 1, 2}, (79)
where 0, 1 and 2 represent F ,I and A, respectively. Now that we have the essential
background, we proceed in the next section to explain our approach to CVRQSS.
3. Approach
In this section, we introduce a CV RQSS protocol and explain how to certify. We
discuss the success criterion of the certification protocol. Furthermore, we specify
what the parties need to do to complete the certification.
3.1. Continuous-variable ramp quantum secret-sharing protocol with Gaussian states and
operations
Here we modify the discrete-variable RQSS protocol discussed in §2.3 into a
continuous-variable counterpart. We choose Gaussian states and operations, which
are convenient mathematically due to the elegance of techniques based on the
semidirect product of the symplectic group and the Heisenberg-Weyl group (1).
However, the price paid for this convenience is discarding potentially powerful
universal operations [21]. Whereas, in the discrete case, specification of number of
players and threshold condition L suffices to determine the cardinality of the three
structures, the CV case is more complicated due to squeezing limitations.
3.1.1. Quantum-optical resources The optical realization comprises displacers that
generate Heisenberg-Weyl group elements and single-mode squeezers, passive
beam-splitters and phase-shifters that generate the semidirect product of the
symplectic group (1). The inputs are vacuum states of light. For the closed disk
Ds :=
{
ζ ∈ C : |ζ| ≤ s2
}
, s ∈ R+, (80)
the dealer’s and players’ single-mode squeezers (20) have limited squeezing
capability corresponding to ζ ∈ Ds, with s = sDmax for the dealer and s = sPmax for
the player.
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3.1.2. Dealer’s task Here we specify the dealer’s task in the RQSS protocol. Dealer’s
tasks include preparing a quantum secret, choosing an access structure, encoding the
quantum secret and distributing shares.
Two-mode squeezed-vacuum source. The dealer prepares a TMSV state (23) drawn
randomly from the uncountable set
QD :=
{
|ζ〉TMSV ; ζ ∈ DsDmax
}
. (81)
The dealer’s task is to encode one mode of this quantum state into an n-mode
entangled state by mixing it with n − 1 ancillary states in an n-mode active
interferometer. The dealer then sends one share to each of the players in such a
way that the elements of power set of players are divided into three predetermined
mutually disjoint sets known as authorized, intermediate and forbidden structures.
In order for the dealer to prepare the TMSV randomly, first, he needs to decide
the complex two-mode squeezing parameter ζ = seiθ (22), where s is bounded by
sDmax. The dealer generates two random numbers a, b ∈ [0, 1]. Then the dealer assigns
s←
√
2asDmax, θ ← 2pib. (82)
Choosing a useful, feasible access structure. The dealer chooses an access structure Γ
based on the desired application. The dealer then runs an algorithm that accepts Γ,
covariance matrix of TMSV state V , sDmax and sPmax as input and yields the encoding
transformation or else null as the output. The dealer then performs the encoding
transformation and distributes the shares among players.
3.1.3. Players’ task The players’ task in any authorized set is to reconstruct the
quantum secret. One player is assigned to hold the secret after reconstruction. The
aforementioned player forms a structure with other players in the authorized set who
perform a Gaussian unitary operation on their shares such that the state of the share
belonging to the assigned player become the same as the original secret state. The
players in any intermediate set are allowed to partially reconstruct the secret state.
Furthermore, the players in a forbidden structure should not gain any information
about the quantum secret whatsoever.
3.2. Certification protocol
In this subsection we introduce a certification protocol that ascertains whether the
RQSS protocol succeeds. The success criterion is discussed in this subsection. We
specify what the parties need to do to complete the certification.
Continuous-variable ramp quantum secret sharing with Gaussian states and operations 16
3.2.1. Agents and resources In this subsection, we establish the agents of the
certification protocol, namely, the dealer, the players and the referee who serves as
skeptical certifier. Furthermore, we specify available resources for each party.
The dealer and players share trusted error-free classical and quantum
communication channels between each other, and the referee also shares trusted
error-free classical and quantum communication channels with each player and
with the dealer. In our continuous-variable setting, the referee possesses single-
mode homodyne detectors [22]. Henceforth, we only refer explicitly to homodyne
measurement, without loss of generality. The dealer possesses a classical computer to
choose the access structure Γ discussed in ¶3.1.2, and the referee possesses a classical
computer to run the certification algorithm.
3.2.2. Dealer’s encoding and announcement The dealer chooses an access structure Γ
discussed in ¶3.1.2 and announces Γ to the players and to the referee. The dealer
encodes shares based on the choice of Γ and the quantum secret, such as a randomly
chosen state in the parameter disk (81), and announces this encoding to the players.
3.2.3. Rounds In this subsubsection, we define ‘rounds’, which are repetitions of
the protocol between the dealer, players and referees. The concept for these rounds
is depicted in Fig. 1. First the dealer prepare a suitable two-mode Gaussian state,
Figure 1: Two-mode entangled state with one share, or mode, sent directly to the
referee and the other share encoded for the players. The referee requests a subset of
players to decode their shares and send this result to the referee who decides
whether they have succeeded or not.
which is the same two-mode Gaussian state for all rounds, and sends one mode to
the referee and the other mode into an encoder, which is also unchanging over all
rounds. This encoder creates shares that are sent to each player.
After the shares are received by players, the referee requests a subset of players,
which can be authorized, forbidden or intermediate, to try to reconstruct the
quantum secret and then send their shares to the referee. The referee then performs
single-mode homodyne measurements and save the measurement results. Rounds
continue until the referee permits the dealer and players to stop.
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3.2.4. Referee’s certification strategy The referee’s task is to certify the protocol by
ascertaining the dealer’s announcement that the access structure is the announced Γ.
The referee conducts tests by requiring many rounds per instance, with each instance
corresponding to testing whether a fixed subset of players is in A, I or F structures
determined by Γ. Due to the statistical nature of the test, the referee cannot be 100%
sure that the inference is correct; rather the referee makes a decision if the probability
of being correct exceeds some threshold value, itself strictly greater than 1/2.
Sufficiency condition. When a sufficiency condition is met to ascertain whether the
subset of players are determined to be in a structure compatible with the dealer’s
announced Γ, the referee instructs the players to stop. If that instance passes the test,
the referee announces a new subset of players to test and the rounds repeat until
the referee has enough data to pass the sufficiency test. If the instance results in the
dealer and players failing, the procedure stops as the team of dealer and players has
failed the test. The dealer and players pass only if every instance passes.
3.3. Summary of approach
Here we modified the discrete-variable RQSS protocol as the CV counterpart in the
case of Gaussian states and operations. Furthermore, we introduced a certification
protocol that ascertains whether the RQSS protocol succeeds. Also we discussed
the success criterion and we specified what the parties need to do to complete the
certification.
4. Results
In this section we present our main results. Our first result is a CV version of
quantum mutual information. This CV quantum mutual information is then used
to quantify quantum-information leakage for Gaussian states and operations. Based
on this leakage characterization, we introduce a certification test, in the framework
of quantum-interactive proofs, and provide a practical test to implement this test.
4.1. CV quantum mutual information
In this subsection, we develop the quantum mutual information for the CV RQSS
quantum access structures and employ it to quantify quantum-information leakage
for Gaussian states and operations. We define I corresponding to CV RQSS protocols
based on quantum mutual information.
Let |ψ〉RS be a pure two-mode Gaussian state and let the quantum secret
be ρs (73). Then
I := {X ; 0 < I (R; X) < I (R; S)} , (83)
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and A and F are obtained from Eqs. (76) and (77), respectively.
We now calculate mutual information between the referee and any multiplayer
structure for TRS03. Specifically, we consider a two-mode entangled state (80)
such that one mode is used for the secret and the other mode is used for the
reference system. We choose this system because that way the referee can do a
sensitive entanglement check to verify that the reconstructed state is entangled with
a reference system as it should be. To simplify matters, without loss of generality, we
investigate in particular a TMSV with one mode being the quantum secret and the
other mode being the reference system.
We solve the quantum mutual information between an extracted secret obtained
by any player structure with k elements and the reference system. In order to do so,
by using Eq. (5), we transform the density function of the reference system and the
extracted secret (A.4) into a Gaussian Wigner function represented by a mean vector
and a covariance matrix from which the symplectic eigenvalues (13) are calculated.
The symplectic eigenvalues (13) are inserted into Eq. (44) in order to calculate
the local and global von Neumann entropy of the extracted secret and reference
system from which the quantum mutual information is solved (52). Figure 2 shows
the resultant quantum mutual information versus squeezing parameter in the case
of |ζ| = 2. In §4.2 we employ the CV quantum mutual-information approach to
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Figure 2: Mutual information versus the squeezing parameter ln a for one mode of a
two mode squeezed vacuum state.
introduce a certification technique for CV RQSS schemes.
4.2. Certification test for RQSS protocols
In this subsection, we establish our model for certification tests. Specifically, we
introduce certification tests for A, F and I , respectively.
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RQSS certification for A. Let IAT be a threshold quantum mutual information
chosen by the referee. This quantum mutual information quantifies the minimum
knowledge that players in an access structure are able to obtain about the secret. Let
β > 0 be a maximum failure probability. A test, which receives copies of some X
as input, and yields accept or reject, is a test for certifying whether X ∈ A, if, with
probability at least 1− β, it both rejects every ρX for which
I (X; R) < IAT (84)
and accepts if
I (X; R) ≥ IAT + δ. (85)
These conditions correspond to soundness (84) and completeness (85) [11, 12, 13].
RQSS certification for F . Let IFT be a threshold quantum mutual information chosen
by the referee, which quantifies the maximum knowledge that players in the
forbidden structure can obtain about the secret. A test, which receives as input copies
of some ρX, and yields accept or reject, is a certification test for certifying whether
X ∈ F , if, with probability at least 1− β, it both accepts every X for which
I (X; R) ≤ IFT − δ, (86)
and rejects a different ρX for
I (X; R) > IFT . (87)
These conditions are completeness (86) and soundness (87).
RQSS certification for I . A test that receives copies of some X as input and yields
accept or reject certifies whether X ∈ I if, for a least probability 1− β, it both rejects
every X for
I (X; R) ≤ IFT − δ, (88)
or
I (X; R) ≥ IAT + δ. (89)
and accepts if
IFT < I (X; R) < I
A
T . (90)
Conditions (88) and 89) are soundness and condition (90) is completeness. In the next
subsection we employ our certification model to propose a practical test to ascertain
RQSS protocols.
4.3. Practical realization of the certification test
In this subsection, we propose a practical algorithm, for determining if X is in A, I
or F . We prove propositions that the algorithm is both sound and complete.
Furthermore, we provide a sufficiency test for the referee to know how many runs
are required for her to have sufficient information to check if a particular element is
in A, I or F .
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4.3.1. Steps for certification Below we provide the steps for certifying RQSS. Before
commencing certification, the referee numerically labels each element of the power
set and proceeds to test each labelled element of the power set in order according to
this labelling. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that each
player holds one share; thus, the number n of modes equals one more than the
number of players, hence shares, in the given subset. This extra mode allows a single-
mode reference field in addition to the modes held by the players.
The referee conducts a test that requires many rounds (3.2.3) for each power-set
element. The test evaluates whether a fixed subset of players is inA, I or F . In order
to do so, the referee estimates the quantum mutual information Ie (R, Se) between the
reference state ρR and the extracted secret state ρSe such that
Ie (R; Se) ∈ [I (R; Se)− e, I (R; Se) + e] , (91)
with a failure probability β < 1/2. Algorithm 4 accepts Ie (R, Se) as input and
determines the structure of the power-set element. If the test result is consistent with
the dealer’s announcement that the access structure is the announced Γ, the referee
announces a new subset of players to test; otherwise the procedure halts as the team
of dealer and players has failed the certification test.
To estimate Ie (R; Se), the referee estimates the expectation values corresponding
to each element of the matrices
G =

2xˆ21
(xˆ1+xˆ2)
2
2 xˆ1xˆ3 + xˆ3xˆ1 xˆ1xˆ4 + xˆ4xˆ1
(xˆ1+xˆ2)
2
2 2xˆ
2
2 xˆ2xˆ3 + xˆ3xˆ2 xˆ2xˆ4 + xˆ4xˆ2
xˆ1xˆ3 + xˆ3xˆ1 xˆ2xˆ3 + xˆ3xˆ2 2xˆ23
(xˆ3+xˆ4)
2
2
xˆ1xˆ4 + xˆ4xˆ1 xˆ3xˆ4 + xˆ4xˆ3
(xˆ3+xˆ4)
2
2 2xˆ
2
4
 , (92)
and
C =
(
xˆ1 xˆ2 xˆ3 xˆ4
)
, (93)
with xˆ defined in Eq. (3). The first and second modes hold reference and
reconstructed secret states, respectively. The referee’s result is then used to estimate
the covariance matrix (10) of ρRSe according to [13]
VRSeij = 〈Gij〉 − 〈Ci〉〈Cj〉, ij /∈ {12, 21, 34, 43}, (94)
VRSeij = 2〈Gij〉 − 〈Gii〉/2− 〈Gjj〉/2− 〈Ci〉〈Cj〉, ij ∈ {12, 21, 34, 43}. (95)
This covariance matrix is used to calculate the entropies of ρSe , ρR and ρRSe using
Algorithm 1. The resultant entropies are then inserted into the standard formula for
quantum mutual information (58).
The expectation value of each element of (92) and (93) is calculated by
performing multiple homodyne measurements on identical and independent copies
of ρRSe and taking the average of the measurement results. Using Chebyshev’s
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inequality [13], the referee calculates an upper-bound for the estimation error of
each expectation value as a function of number of rounds and β. Subsequently,
this estimation error is then used to calculate the maximum expectation values’
estimation error emax of covariance-matrix entries via the standard formula for
error propagation. Afterwards she calculates the bound on the estimation error
of entropies following Algorithm 2. The estimation error of Ie (R; Se) is bounded
by summation of the entropies estimation errors. The rounds continue until the
estimation error of Ie (R; Se) is below a prespecified acceptable e error.
Algorithm 1 Continuous-variable quantum entropy (HvN).
Input:
n ∈N . Number of modes
V ∈ R2n ×R2n . Covariance matrix
Ω ∈ Z2n ×Z2n (4)
Output:
HvN ∈ R+ . von Neumann entropy
function VONNEUMANNH(V )
ν← Eigenvalues+ (iΩV ). . Calculates positive eigenvalues.
ν± ← ν±12 .
return HvN ← ν+ · logν+ + ν− · logν−.
end function
Algorithm 2 Upper bound of HvN estimation error.
Input:
n ∈N . Number of modes
V ∈ R2n ×R2n . Covariance matrix
emax . Maximum estimation error of covariance matrix elements
Output:
HuppervN,error ∈ R+ . Upper bound of QMI estimation error
function HUPPERVN,ERROR(V , emax)
σmax ←maximal singular value of V .
σmin ←minimal singular value of V .
return HuppervN,error← κ (1+ log (2nσmax)) 2nemax. . κ = σmaxσmin is always finite.
end function
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Algorithm 3 Estimation of QMI.
Input:
T ∈N . Number of trials
ρ⊗T ∈ B (L2(R2T)) . T copies of the joint state ρ for the reference and players’
reconstructed state
e ∈ R+ . Error tolerance for estimated QMI
TOL ∈ (0,1/2) . Failure probability tolerance
σ ∈ R+ . A uniform upper bound on the standard deviations of measurement
results
HOMMEAS[ρ, x, MODE, θ] .
Homodyne measurement on mode MODE∈ {0, 1} with respect to local-oscillator
phase θ; replaces ρ by some |x〉 〈x| with probability 〈x| ρ |x〉
Output:
ESTQMI ∈ R+ . Estimated QMI
procedure ESTIMATEQMI(e,TOL,T, ρ⊗T, σ, HOMMEAS[ρ, x, MODE, θ])
for i from 1 to 2 do
for j from 1 to 2 do
COVRECON [ij]← 0 . Initialize
covariance matrix for the players’ reconstructed state including position-position,
position-momentum, momentum-position and momentum-momentum
COVREF [ij]← 0 . Initialize covariance matrix for the reference
state including position-position, position-momentum, momentum-position and
momentum-momentum
end for
end for
for i from 1 to 4 do
HOMRESULT [i]← 0 . Initialize vector comprising sums of in-phase and
out-of-phase homodyne measurements of modes 0 and 1
for j from 1 to 4 do
COVRECREF [ij]← 0 . Initialize joint reconstructed-reference
covariance matrix including position-position, position-momentum, momentum-
position and momentum-momentum
SECONDMOM[ij]← 0 . Second-moment matrix defined in Eq. (92)
end for
end for
ε←
⌈
σ
√
1
l
(
1−(1−TOL)1/14
)
⌉
. Maximum estimation error of measurement
results expectation values with a least probability TOL
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l ← 0 . Number of times that the referee performs the sufficiency test
RHO ← ρ . Initialize RHO to the first of input ρ⊗T
eQMI ← 2e . Initialize to any value greater than e
for r from 1 to T do
while eQMI > e do
l ← l + 1 . Increment the sufficiency-test counter
if 14l > T then . Referee measures 14 copies before ascertaining
sufficiency
return Fail
EXIT . Abort procedure if fewer than 14 copies remain
end if
if r− 1 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 0, 0) . In-phase homodyne measurement of
the reconstructed state
HOMRESULT[1]← HOMRESULT[1] + x . Sum detection outcomes
else if r− 2 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 0, pi2 ) . Out-of-phase homodyne
measurement of the reconstructed state
HOMRESULT[2]← HOMRESULT[2] + x . Sum detection outcomes
else if r− 3 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 1, 0) . In-phase homodyne measurement of
the reference state
HOMRESULT[3]← HOMRESULT[3] + x . Sum detection outcomes
else if r− 4 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 1, pi2 ) . Out-of-phase homodyne
measurement of the reference state
HOMRESULT[4]← HOMRESULT[4] + x . Sum detection outcomes
else if r− 5 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 0, 0) . In-phase homodyne measurement of
the reconstructed state
SECONDMOM[11]← SECONDMOM[11] + 2x2
else if r− 6 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 0, 0) . In-phase homodyne measurement of
the reconstructed state
y← x
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 1, 0) . In-phase homodyne measurement of
the reference state
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SECONDMOM[13]← SECONDMOM[13] + 2xy
SECONDMOM[31]← SECONDMOM[13]
else if r− 7 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 0, 0) . In-phase homodyne measurement of
the reconstructed state
y← x
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 1, pi2 ) . Out-of-phase homodyne
measurement of the reference state
SECONDMOM[14]← SECONDMOM[14] + 2xy
SECONDMOM[41]← SECONDMOM[14]
else if r− 8 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 0, pi2 ) . Out-of-phase homodyne
measurement of the reconstructed state
SECONDMOM[22]← SECONDMOM[22] + 2x2
else if r− 9 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 0, pi2 ) . Out-of-phase homodyne
measurement of the reconstructed state
y← x
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 1, 0) . In-phase homodyne measurement of
the reference state
SECONDMOM[23]← SECONDMOM[23] + 2xy
SECONDMOM[32]← SECONDMOM[23]
else if r− 10 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 0, pi2 ) . Out-of-phase homodyne
measurement of the reconstructed state
y← x
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 1, pi2 ) . Out-of-phase homodyne
measurement of the reference state
SECONDMOM[24]← SECONDMOM[24] + 2xy
SECONDMOM[42]← SECONDMOM[24]
else if r− 11 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 1, 0) . In-phase homodyne measurement of
the reference state
SECONDMOM[33]← SECONDMOM[33] + 2x2
else if r− 12 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 1, pi2 ) . Out-of-phase homodyne
measurement of the reference state
SECONDMOM[44]← SECONDMOM[44] + 2x2
else if r− 13 MOD 14=0 then . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Continuous-variable ramp quantum secret sharing with Gaussian states and operations 25
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 0, pi4 ) . Homodyne measurement of the
reconstructed state with respect to local-oscillator phase pi4
SECONDMOM[12] = 2x2 − SECONDMOM[11]2 − SECONDMOM[22]2
SECONDMOM[21]← SECONDMOM[12]
elser− 14 MOD 14=0 . Measure one of T copies of ρ
Call HOMMEAS(RHO, x, 1, pi4 ) . Homodyne measurement of the
reference state with respect to local-oscillator phase pi4
SECONDMOM[34] = 2x2 − SECONDMOM[33]2 − SECONDMOM[44]2
SECONDMOM[43]← SECONDMOM[34]
end if
for i from 1 to 4 do
for j from i to 4 do
COVRECREF [ij]← 1l (SECONDMOM[ij]−HOMRESULT[i]HOMRESULT[j])
COVRECREF [ij]← COVRECREF [ji]
end for
end for
for i from 1 to 2 do
for j from 1 to 2 do
COVRECON [ij]← COVRECON [ij]
COVREF [ij]← COVRECON [i + 2j + 2]
end for
end for
εmax ← εl maxij
√
1+ (HOMRESULT [i])2 + (HOMRESULT [j])2 (96)
εmax ←max
{
εmax,
ε
l
√
4+ (HOMRESULT [1])2 + (HOMRESULT [2])2, (97)
ε
l
√
4+ (HOMRESULT [3])2 + (HOMRESULT [4])2
}
(98)
. Via standard error propagation method
eQMI ← ∑Q=Rp,p,R HuppervN,error
(
Ve,Q,εmax
)
. See Algorithm 2
end while
end for
return ESTQMI ← ∑Q=R,p vonNeumannH(Ve,Q)− vonNeumannH(Ve,Rp) .
see Algorithm 1
end procedure
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Algorithm 4 Certification of RQSS protocols.
Input:
T ∈N . Number of trials for each instance
IFT ∈ R+ . Threshold quantum mutual information for the forbidden structure
IAT ∈ R+ . Threshold quantum mutual information for all authorized structures
e ∈ R+ . Estimation error bound of estimated QMI
TOL ∈ (0,1/2) . Maximum failure probability
P ∈N . Cardinality of the set of players
F [J] ∈ {0, 1, 2} . Returns Jth power set of players structure claimed by the
dealer (79)⊗2P−1
J=1 ρ
⊗T
J ∈ B
(
L2(R2
PT)
)
. ρJ is the joint state for the reference and players’
reconstructed state for Jth subset of players
σ ∈ R+ . A uniform upper bound on the standard deviations of measurement
results
HOMMEAS[ρ, x, MODE, θ] .
Homodyne measurement on mode MODE∈ {0, 1} with respect to local-oscillator
phase θ; replaces ρ by some |x〉 〈x| with probability 〈x| ρ |x〉
Output:
b ∈ {0, 1} . Certify (b = 1) or not certify (b = 0)
procedure CERTIFICATION(IFT , I
A
T , e, P,
⊗2P−1
J=1 ρ
⊗T
J , F[J], σ, TOL, HOMMEAS[ρ, x, MODE, θ])
c← F [1] . initialize the structure of power-set elements based on referees’ test
to F [1]
PASS ← 0 . initialize the number of power-set elements that pass the test
for J from 1 to 2P − 1 do
ESTQMI ← ESTIMATEQMI
(
e, TOL, T, ρ⊗TJ , σ, HOMMEAS[ρ, x, MODE, θ]
)
.
see Algorithm 3.
if
ESTQMI > IAT + e, (99)
then
c← 2
else if
IFT − e < ESTQMI < IAT + e, (100)
then
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c← 1
else
c← 0
end if
if c = F[J] then PASS ← PASS + 1
else
EXIT . Halt
end if
end for
if PASS = 2P then
b← 1.
else
b← 0.
end if
return b
end procedure
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Proposition 1. Algorithm 3 ensures
pr [|Ie (X; R)− I (X; R)| ≤ eQMI] ≥ 1− β, (101)
and
eQMI ∈ O
(
1√
N
)
(102)
for N the number of rounds.
Proof. Using Chebyshev’s inequality [13],
pr
[∣∣G¯ij −E (Gij)∣∣ ≥ e] ≤ σ2e2l , (103)
pr [|C¯i −E (Ci)| ≥ e] ≤ σ
2
e2l
. (104)
Equations (103) and (104) equivalently are
pr
[∣∣G¯ij −E (Gij)∣∣ ≤ e] ≥1− σ2e2l , (105)
pr [|C¯i −E (Ci)| ≤ e] ≥1− σ
2
e2l
. (106)
Assigning
e←

σ√
l
(
1− (1− β) 114
)
 (107)
and assuming an independent identically distributed (iid) protocol delivers
pr
[∀i, j : |C¯i −E (Ci)| ∧ ∣∣G¯ij −E (Gij)∣∣ ≤ e] ≥ 1− β. (108)
Let emax be the maximum estimation error of estimated covariance matrix, which
is calculated in terms of e (107) via standard error propagation methods. In the
following we give an upper bound on the estimation error of quantum mutual
information in terms of emax. In order to do so, we introduce some helpful notation
and theorems used in our proofs.
For any two Gaussian states with corresponding covariance matrices VA and VB,
the entropy difference is bounded by [36]
|HvN (VA)− HvN (VB)| ≤ κ (VA)K‖VA − VB‖1, (109)
for
K := 1+ log
[
max
(
‖VA‖∞, 12
(
‖V −1A ‖−1∞ − 1
))]
. (110)
Also ∥∥∥A−1∥∥∥−1
∞
≤ ‖A‖∞ , (111)
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holds for any covariance matrixA [37]. Hence,
1
2
(∥∥∥A−1∥∥∥−1
∞
− 1
)
≤ ‖A‖∞ . (112)
By substituting Eq. (112) into Eq. (110), we obtain the perturbation bound
|HvN (VA)− HvN (VB)| ≤ κ (VA) ‖VA − VB‖1 (1+ log (‖VA‖∞)) . (113)
For any Q ∈ {R, P, RP}, let V e,Q and V Q be the estimated and real covariance
matrices, respectively. Then∥∥∥V e,Q∥∥∥
∞
≤ ‖U‖∞ ‖Σ‖∞ ‖V ‖∞ ≤ σmax,e,Q dimV e,Q. (114)
Also ∥∥∥V Q − V e,Q∥∥∥
1
≤ εmax dimV e,Q. (115)
Furthermore, let us define
∆HvN (Q) := HvN
(
V Q
)
− HvN
(
V e,Q
)
, (116)
and
∆I (X) = I (X; R)− Ie (X; R) . (117)
Thus,
∆I (X) = ∆HvN (X) + ∆HvN (R)− ∆HvN (RX) (118)
Due to the triangle inequality,
|∆I (X)| ≤ |∆HvN (X)|+ |∆HvN (R)|+ |∆HvN (RX)| . (119)
Each of the terms in the right-hand side of Eq. (119) is suitably achieved by using
Eq. (113). Substituting Eqs. (115) and (116) into the resultant equation delivers
Eq. (101).
Now we show that eQMI scales properly with respect to number of rounds. Using
the Weyl [38] perturbation bound for singular value decomposition, we conclude
κ
(
V e,Q
)
, σmax,e,Q ∈ O(1), εmax ∈ O
(
1√
N
)
. (120)
Therefore, the error bound scales inversely with square root of the number of rounds.
Next we prove the algorithm 4 is both sound and complete.
Proposition 2. (i) If X ∈ A, Algorithm 4 passes with probability at least 1− β and
(ii) if X /∈ A then the algorithm fails with probability at least 1− β.
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Proof. We show cases (i) and (ii) in sequence.
Case (i): We first recall that
X ∈ A =⇒ I (X; R) ≥ IAT + δ. (121)
Also
pr [|I (X; R)− Ie (X; R)| ≤ e] ≥ 1− β. (122)
Therefore,
pr
[
IAT + δ− e ≤ Ie (X; R)
]
≥ 1− β. (123)
As δ− e ≥ e, we conclude
pr
[
IAT + e ≤ Ie (X; R)
]
≥ 1− β. (124)
Thus, Algorithm 4 accepts with probability at least 1− β if X ∈ A.
Case (ii): We note that
pr [Ie (X; R)− e ≤ I (X; R)] ≥ 1− β (125)
Therefore, substituting Eq. (84) into Eq. (125) delivers
pr
[
Ie (X; R) < IAT + e
]
≥ 1− β. (126)
Thus, Algorithm 4 rejects with probability at least 1− β if X /∈ A.
Proposition 3. (i) If X ∈ F , then Algorithm 4 accepts with probability at least 1− β
and
(ii) if X /∈ F then Algorithm 4 rejects with probability at least 1− β.
Proof. We show cases (i) and (ii) in sequence.
Case (i):
X ∈ F =⇒ I (X; R) ≤ IFT − δ. (127)
Also
pr [|I (X; R)− Ie (X; R)| ≤ e] ≥ 1− β. (128)
Therefore,
pr [Ie (X; R) ≤ I (X; R) + e] ≥ 1− β. (129)
Substituting Eq. (127) in Eq. (129) delivers
pr
[
Ie (X; R) ≤ IFT − δ+ e
]
≥ 1− β. (130)
As δ− e ≥ e, we conclude
pr
[
Ie (X; R) ≤ IFT − e
]
≥ 1− β. (131)
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Thus, Algorithm 4 accepts with probability at least 1− β if X ∈ F .
Case (ii):
pr [I (X; R)− e ≤ Ie (X; R)] ≥ 1− β. (132)
Substituting Eq. (87) into Eq. (129) delivers
pr
[
IFT − e ≤ Ie (X; R)
]
≥ 1− β. (133)
Thus, Algorithm 4 rejects with probability at least 1− β if X /∈ F .
Proposition 4. (i) If X ∈ I , then Algorithm 4 accepts with probability at least 1− β
and
(ii) X /∈ I then Algorithm 4 rejects with probability at least 1− β.
Proof. We show cases (i) and (ii) in sequence.
Case (i):
X ∈ I =⇒ IFT < I (X; R) < IAT . (134)
Also
pr [|I (X; R)− Ie (X; R)| ≤ e] ≥ 1− β. (135)
Therefore,
pr [I (X; R)− e ≤ Ie (X; R) ≤ I (X; R) + e] ≥ 1− β. (136)
Substituting Eq. (134) into Eq. (136) delivers
pr
[
IFT − e ≤ Ie (X; R) ≤ IAT + e
]
≥ 1− β. (137)
Thus, Algorithm 4 accepts with probability at least 1− β if X ∈ I .
Case (ii):
pr [Ie (X; R)− e ≤ I (X; R)] ≥ 1− β, (138)
and
pr [I (X; R) ≤ Ie (X; R) + e] ≥ 1− β. (139)
Substituting Eq. (88) and Eq. (89) into Eq. (138) and Eq. (139), respectively, delivers
pr
[
Ie (X; R) ≤ IFT − δ+ e
]
≥ 1− β, (140)
and
pr
[
IAT ≤ Ie (X; R)− δ+ e
]
≥ 1− β. (141)
As δ− e ≥ e, we conclude
pr
[
Ie (X; R) ≤ IFT − e
]
≥ 1− β, (142)
and
pr
[
IAT + e ≤ Ie (X; R)
]
≥ 1− β. (143)
Thus, Algorithm 4 rejects with probability at least 1− β if X /∈ I .
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5. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss our results. We have two main results. The first result is a
security analysis, which assigns subsets of players to each of the three structures,
namely, authorized, intermediate, and forbidden structures. The second result is
certification, which is performed by a referee. In our security analysis, we not only
determine structures for subset of players, but we also quantify information leakage.
For certification we introduce a referee who has limited resources such as finite local
oscillator field. We now discuss these two results.
We base our approach on TRS03, which divides subsets of players into
authorized and forbidden structures. TRS03 do not consider the intermediate
structure because their security analysis is based on assuming infinite squeezing, but
finite squeezing is responsible for information leakage, which leads us to introduce
the intermediate structure based on ramp secret sharing concepts. Ramp quantum
secret sharing has been considered before in two cases: discrete-variable threshold
ramp quantum secret sharing [5] and entanglement sharing [39]. These analysis did
not treat the continuous-variable case, however. In our case, for any amount of finite
squeezing, we construct encoding and decoding procedures and thereby assign each
subset to the correct structure.
Now we describe our result for certification. In our protocol, the dealer supplies
the players with the encoded state, and in fact the state would be entangled with
another share that goes directly to the referee. The referee identifies which subset of
players are to transmit the decoded state to the referee, and the referee can combine
this state with any shares that did not go through the players and then performs
homodyne detection [40, 13]. The referee performs homodyne measurement, and,
if the local oscillator strength is infinite, then standard homodyne theory suffices to
describe the statistics. We study the particular case of the referee performing tests
based on Gaussian states and repeated measurements to allow the referee to estimate
accurately the mean and covariance of the resultant state. The referee’s procedure is
valid even in the case of limited local-oscillator strength.
As our procedure is rather complicated and involves multiple parties, we
have augmented our analysis by including pseudocode to explain step-by-step
instructions on how to complete the procedure. Our pseudocode analysis makes
clear exactly what is required of each party in the procedure. This pseudocode
description could be a useful approach for describing future continuous-variable
quantum-information protocols.
6. Conclusions
We have developed continuous-variable quantum mutual information with an
external reference system in order to quantify the leakage of information and
evaluate the security of continuous-variable quantum secret sharing protocols.
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Furthermore, we prove that information leakage arising in the TRS03 scheme
monotonically decreases with reduced squeezing. In addition, we introduce
a certification process for continuous-variable quantum secret sharing in the
framework of quantum-interactive proofs and ramp quantum secret sharing
schemes.
Pseudocodes have been introduced in order to represent clearly the sequence of
steps taken to solve the certification problem. Subsequently, we provide a practical
realization of the certification test using homodyne detection, including a sufficiency
condition on the number of experimental runs the referee has to perform. We prove
that the statistical error in the referee’s estimated quantum mutual information scales
with the inverse square root of number of rounds.
Our certification procedure assumes the extracted secret states are iid. In reality,
this iid property does not hold due to the environmental noises. Furthermore,
in quantum secret sharing schemes, malicious parties might generate highly
complicated entanglement among samples to fool the referee. As a future line of
research, it is important to extend our certification procedure to the case of samples
that are not independent and identically distributed.
Another useful avenue of research would be to analyze the effect of systematic
errors in the referee’s measurement procedure. As a final remark, we emphasize
that our certification approach is applicable to certifying other quantum-information
protocols such as summoning of quantum information in space time, quantum
error correcting codes and quantum teleportation in the framework of quantum-
interactive proof systems.
Appendix A. Calculation of quantum mutual information
The total density operator ρˆT of all shares and the reference system after the
extraction procedure is
ρˆT =
1
pi
∫
R2n+2
dnxdnx′ dydy′ ρ
(
y, x1, y′, x′1
) |y〉 〈y′| ⊗ n⊗
i=1
|ξi〉 〈ξ ′i |
× exp
{
−
k−1
∑
i=1
[
y2i + y
′2
i
2a2
+
a2
(
z2i + z
′2
i
)
2
]}
, (A.1)
where
ρ
(
y, x1, y′, x′1
)
= exp
[
− e
−2|ζ| (x1 + y)2
4
− e
2|ζ| (y− x1)2
4
− e
−2|ζ| (x′1 + y
′)2
4
− e
2|ζ| (y′ − x′1)2
4
]
. (A.2)
The joint density operator
ρ′ = 〈ω′η′| ρˆ |ωη〉 , (A.3)
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of the extracted secret and the reference system is obtained by tracing ρˆT over shares
{2, 3, . . . n}. The resultant density matrix is
ρ′
(
ω, η,ω′, η′
)
=
a
pi
√
1
a2 + 12
(
e2|ζ| + e−2|ζ|
)
v2
× exp
{−e−2|ζ|4 − e2|ζ|4 +
(
−4e−2|ζ| + 4e2|ζ|
)2
4a2 + e
2|ζ|
2 +
e−2|ζ|
2 v
2
(ω2 +ω′2)
+
(
e−4|ζ| + e4|ζ| + 2
16a2 + 8
(
e2|ζ| + e−2|ζ|
)
v2
− e
−2|ζ|
4
− e
2|ζ|
4
)(
η2 + η′2
)
+
( (e2|ζ| + e−2|ζ|)
2a2 + 2
(
e2|ζ| + e−2|ζ|
)
v2
− e
−2|ζ|
2
− e
2|ζ|
2
) (
ωη +ω′η′
)
+

(
e2|ζ| + e−2|ζ|
)
2a2 + 2
(
e2|ζ| + e−2|ζ|
)
v2
(ηω′ + η′ω)
+
 e−4|ζ|
(
e4|ζ| − 1
)2
8a2 + 4
(
e2|ζ| + e−2|ζ|
)
v2
ωω′
+
(
e−4|ζ| + e4|ζ| + 2
16a2 + 8
(
e2|ζ| + e−2|ζ|
)
v2
)
ηη′
}
, (A.4)
where v2 = γ1 γ1 for which γ1 = (γ11,γ12, . . . ,γ1k−1) (38). Also, u2 = uuwhere
{ui} are the coefficients of the expansion αj = ∑k−1i=2 uiβij for which j = 2, ..., k − 1.
Then, by employing Eqs. (6),(7), and (8), we transform this density matrix into a
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Wigner function representation (6), namely
W (q1, p1, q2, p2) =
2a
pi2
√
e2|ζ|
2a2e2|ζ| + e4|ζ| + 1
√
a2e2|ζ|
2a2e2|ζ| + u2
(
e4|ζ| + 1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
× exp
{− a2
(
e4|ζ| + 1
)
+ 2e2|ζ|
2a2e2|ζ| + e4|ζ| + 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
β1
q21
+
− a2
(
e4|ζ| + 1
)
2a2e2|ζ| + e4|ζ| + 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
β2
q22 +
 2a2
(
e4|ζ| − 1
)
2a2e2|ζ| + e4|ζ| + 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
β3
q1q2
+
− a2
(
e4|ζ| + 1
)
+ 2u2e2|ζ|
2a2e2|ζ| + u2
(
e4|ζ| + 1
)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ1
p21
+
(
−
a2
(
e4|ζ| + 1
)
2a2e2|ζ| + u2
(
e4|ζ| + 1
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ2
p22
+
− 2a2
(
e4|ζ| − 1
)
2a2e2|ζ| + u2
(
e4|ζ| + 1
)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ3
p1p2
}
. (A.5)
By using Eq. (9), this Wigner function is employed to derive the generic elements
of the covariance matrix V corresponding to the joint reference and extracted-secret
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state. The elements of V are
V12 = V21 = V14 = V41 = V23 = V32 = V34 = V43 = 0, (A.6a)
V11 = N
2pi2
β1/22
(
β1 − β
2
3
4β2
)3/2 (
γ1γ2 − γ
2
3
4
)1/2 , (A.6b)
V13 = N
pi2β3
2
(
β1β2 − β
2
3
4
)3/2 (
γ1γ2 − γ
2
3
4
)1/2 = V31, (A.6c)
V22 = N
2pi2
γ1/22
(
γ1 − γ
2
3
4γ2
)3/2 (
β1β2 − β
2
3
4
)1/2 , (A.6d)
V24 = N
pi2γ3
2
(
γ1γ2 − γ
2
3
4
)3/2 (
β1β2 − β
2
3
4
)1/2 = V42, (A.6e)
V33 = N
2pi2
β1/21
(
β2 − β
2
3
4β1
)3/2 (
γ1γ2 − γ
2
3
4
)1/2 , (A.6f)
V44 = N
2pi2
γ1/21
(
γ2 − γ
2
3
4γ1
)3/2 (
β1β2 − β
2
3
4
)1/2 . (A.6g)
(A.6h)
The covariance matrix of the extracted secret and reference system denoted by VS
and VR are
VS =
(
V11 V12
V21 V22
)
, VR =
(
V33 V34
V43 V44
)
. (A.7)
Also the joint covariance matrix of the extracted secret and reference system is
VρRS =
(
Vij
)
. (A.8)
For convenience, let us also define
C :=
(
V13 V14
V23 V24
)
. (A.9)
Using Eq. (14), symplectic eigenvalues of VS and VR denoted by νS and νR are
νR =
√
detVR, νS =
√
detVS, (A.10)
for which VS and VR are defined in Eq. (A.7). Symplectic eigenvalues of VρRS denoted
by ν± is calculated using Eq. (16), therefore,
ν± =
√√√√∆±√∆2 − 4 detVρRS
2
, (A.11)
where ∆ = detVS + detVR + 2 detC.
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